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The Attorney General's Authority to




Since the adoption of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, the
authority of the state attorney general to advocate or advise the constitu-
tional invalidity of statutes has been an open issue.' Notwithstanding the
need for a definitive resolution of this question, the judiciary has chosen
to bypass the problem except for the commonwealth court's opinion in
Hetherington v. McHale.2 In that case, an unanimous court resolved that
"the Attorney General is without power or authority, even though he is of
the opinion that a statute is unconstitutional, to implement his opinion in
such a manner as to effectively abrogate or suspend such statute, which is
presumptively constitutional until declared otherwise by the Judiciary." 3
On appeal, however, the state supreme court addressed the merits of the
case directly, and, therefore, found it unnecessary to decide the question
of the attorney general's authority.'
With the increase in litigation involving state agencies and the
adoption of a constitutional amendment providing for an elected attorney
general, 5 this issue is likely to arise in the future. Thus, the purpose of
this article is to review and analyze the commonwealth court's opinion in
* B.A. 1958, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1961, Harvard Law School; Acting
Attorney General, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. This article represents the personal
views of the author and was substantially completed before his appointment to the position
of Attorney General. The author wishes to thank Bernard V. O'Hare of the Dickinson Law
Review for his assistance in completing this article.
I. See notes 39-70 and accompanying text infra.
2. 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (1973), rev'd, 458 Pa. 479, 329 A.2d 250
(1974).
3. 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 512, 311 A.2d at 168.
4. 458 Pa. at 483 n.3, 329 A.2d at 252 n.3. This disposition by the supreme court is
consistent with prior holdings in which it has adopted controversial positipns taken by the
attorney general without inquiry into whether he had the right to raise the issue. See, e.g.,
Ault Unemployment Compensation Case, 188 Pa. Super Ct. 260, 146 A.2d 344 (1958), rev'd,
398 Pa. 250, 157 A.2d 375 (1960). In one instance, the supreme court adopted contentions
advanced by the attorney general while simultaneously denying his right to raise them. York
v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 449 Pa. 136, 295 A.2d 825 (1972), overruling
Northern Pennsylvania Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n, 333 Pa. 265, 5
A.2d 133 (1939).
5. PA. CONSr. art. 4, § 4.1 (1968, amended 1978).
Hetheringtor,6 to set forth the history of the attorney general's authority
as it has been resolved by both the courts and the attorney general's
office,7 to discuss the legal basis of the attorney general's authority, 8 and
to offer a resolution with respect to three different ways in which the
attorney general may deal with constitutional questions.
9
II. Role of the Attorney General in Hetherington
A. The Attorney General's Advice
In Hetherington v. McHale, 1o the state secretary of agriculture was
confronted with the implementation of an amendment to the Harness
Racing Act.1 This amendment reposed the power to determine how
monies from the Pennsylvania Fair Fund were to be distributed among
various agricultural research projects in the hands of a committee
comprised in part of members designated by private organizations.'
2
Since the attorney general was of the opinion that the amendment was
unconstitutional, 13 he directed the secretary of agriculture to refuse to
6. See notes 10-38 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 39-70 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 71-101 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 102-121 and accompanying text infra.
10. 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (1973), rev'd, 458 Pa. 479, 329 A.2d 250
(1974).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2601-2624 (Purdon 1967).
12. The Harness Racing Act had provided that if the proceeds flowing into the
Pennsylvania Fair Fund were to exceed a designated amount, then the secretary of agricul-
ture was to distribute these proceeds for agricultural research projects in accordance with
-recommendations submitted by a committee appointed by him, such committee to include
in its membership the dean of the college of agriculture at the Pennsylvania State University
and the dean of the school of veterinary medicine at the University of Pennsylvania." Act of
December 22, 1959, P.L. 1978, No. 728, § 16(e). The 1972 amendment provided that the
proceeds were to be distributed as determined by a committee composed of
the Secretary of Agriculture, the chairman and a minority member of the Agricul-
ture Committee of the Senate, the chairman and a minority member of the Agricul-
ture Committee of the House of Representatives, six persons designated by the
Pennsylvania State Council of Farm Organizations, the chairman of the State
Harness Racing Commission or his designate, one person designated by the Penn-
sylvania Canners and Fruit Processors Association, one person designated by the
Pennsylvania Association of County Fairs and three persons designated by the
Secretary of Agriculture from his staff.
Act of September 28, 1972, P.L. 897, No. 212, § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2616(e) (Purdon
Supp. 1977-78).
It is noteworthy that the 1972 amendment had been vetoed by the Governor, Veto No. 5
(1972), but the legislature successfully overrode the veto. HISTORY OF SENATE AND HOUSE
BILLS, SESSIONS OF 1971 AND 1972, A-189. In its amicus curiae brief before the common-
wealth court, the legislature argued that once a bill has become law over the governor's
veto, the executive branch has no choice but to enforce the measure.
The overriding of a gubernatorial veto is an extraordinary procedure rarely
resorted to in the history of our Commonwealth. The last time the General Assem-
bly successfully overrode a veto was in 1917. When the General Assembly exer-
cises this power, the statute is entitled to more consideration than the arbitrary
suspension accorded to it by the Attorney General. Such a statute, at the very
minimum, must remain in effect unless and until invalidated by a court with
appropriate jurisdiction.
Amicus Curiae Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Preliminary Objections at 10, Hethering-
ton v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (1973). But see notes 33-37 and
accompanying text infra.
13. PA. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. 30, 3 Pa. B. 712, 713 (1973).
recognize those members of the committee appointed by private organiza-
tions.t 4 Heeding this advice from the state's chief law officer, the secre-
tary was rewarded with three suits in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court. 15
B. The Commonwealth Court's Decision
Because the court determined that the statutory amendment in ques-
tion was constitutional, it was unnecessary to resolve the issue of the
attorney general's authority. Nevertheless, President Judge Bowman de-
clared for the court that "[s]uch a fundamental question. . . deserves to
be raised from the murky uncertainty in which it has rested for too many
years in Pennsylvania.''16 Based on an analysis of the attorney general's
statutory and common-law powers, the court concluded that the attorney
general has no authority to implement his decision that a statute is
unconstitutional by directing an administrative officer to ignore it.17
1. The Attorney General's Statutory Powers. -The court first
examined the statutory powers of the attorney general, specifically the
law that provides that any department requesting legal advice from the
Department of Justice is bound by the advice rendered.' 8 Based upon its
reading of the supreme court's decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Wood-
ruff v. Lewis, 19 the commonwealth court concluded that a department is
bound only by an attorney general's opinion concerning an administrative
as opposed to a constitutional matter.
20
This resolution reflects an extremely literal and questionable reading
of the Lewis case. In Lewis, the supreme court declared that if the auditor
14. The attorney general not only concluded that the amendment in question was
unconstitutional, but implemented that decision by directing the secretary of agriculture that
"you must refuse to recognize those persons [i.e., those from private organizations] as
members of the committee and must deny them any authority to participate in deliberations
of the committee." Id.
15. Since the plaintiffs were unsure of the appropriate form of action, actions were
instituted in equity (to enjoin meetings of the committee and expenditures of funds unless
plaintiffs were permitted to participate) and in quo warranto and mandamus (to determine
that plaintiffs were appropriately appointed to the committee). The difficulty in ascertaining
the appropriate form of action was recognized by the commonwealth court, 10 Pa. Commw.
Ct. at 504, 311 A.2d at 164, and, fortunately, the problem has been rectified by adoption of
chapter 15 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which delineates the proce-
dure for judicial review of governmental determinations. See PA. R.A.P. 1502 and accom-
panying note.
16. 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 508, 311 A.2d at 165.
17. Id. at 512, 311 A.2d at 168.
18. Section 512 of the Administrative Code provides in pertinent part,
Whenever any department . .. shall require legal advice concerning its
conduct or operation, or when any legal difficulty or dispute arises, . . . it shall be
the duty of such department. . . to refer the same to the Department of Justice.
It shall be the duty of any department . . .having requested and received
advice from the Department of Justice regarding the official duty of such depart-
ment . . . to follow the same . ...
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 192 (Purdon 1962).
19. 282 Pa. 306, 127 A. 828 (1925).
20. 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 509, 311 A.2d at 166.
general believes that a requisition made by a state agency is unlawful, he
is compelled by the Administrative Code to refer the matter to the
Department of Justice for the attorney general's opinion and is bound by
the advice rendered. 2' By way of dictum, the court further opined that the
auditor general, a constitutional officer who is sworn to uphold the
constitution, need not follow the advice given by the attorney general if
the auditor general believes the result to be unconstitutional.
22
The supreme court, however, did not consider the converse issue,
i.e., whether the official is bound to follow the attorney general's advice
that a statute is unconstitutional. Nor did the court have before it the issue
whether there is a difference between a state official such as the auditor
general, who is a constitutional officer, 23 and the secretary of agriculture,
who is not.24 It can, however, be readily concluded that if the auditor
general, who may have no legal training, has the right to reach his own
conclusion regarding the unconstitutionality of a statute, he would most
certainly have the right to rely on the advice of the attorney general, the
state's chief lawyer, that a statute is unconstitutional. It must also follow
that a nonconstitutional officer should have the same right, especially
when receiving the advice of the attorney general, who is, like the auditor
general, a constitutional officer.2 5 It can, therefore, be deduced that the
attorney general does have the authority to issue the opinions on which
these officers may rely. The commonwealth court's quote from the Lewis
case on this issue thus appears to be misplaced.
26
21. Commonwealth ex rel. Woodruff v. Lewis, 282 Pa. 306, 315, 127 A.828, 831
(1925). Since the auditor general is now provided with his own counsel, the attorney
general no longer renders advice to the auditor general. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 312-13
(Purdon 1962).
22. The dictum originated in the court of common pleas, in which Judge Fox wrote
that the legislature may direct the auditor general
where he shall obtain his legal advice. . . . In this respect the command of
the legislature is fuuy controlling, so long as it does not attempt to take from Lthe
auditor general] his constitutional duty of which he cannot be relieved by an act of
assembly. He cannot feel that he is supporting, obeying and defending the constitu-
tion when acting and complying with a statute which is unconstitutional as he
construes it, notwithstanding being advised to the contrary by the Department of
Justice. .*. . Nothing short of a determination by a court of proper and competent
jurisdiction of the question of the constitutionality of a statute can control him.
27 Dauph. 311, 316 (Pa. C.P. 1924). Agreeing with Judge Fox, the supreme court observed
that the auditor general is sworn to uphold the state and federal constitutions.
This therefore, is his constitutional duty, overthrowing any antagonistic obligation
attempted to be imposed by legislation. If we could find an interpretation for the
Administrative Code which would require an executive officer to do an unconstitu-
tional thing (which we cannot see in it, however), we would be compelled to so
interpret it, if possible, so as to exclude that result . . . ; happily its reasonable
construction does this.
282 Pa. at 315-16, 127 A. at 831.
23. PA. CONST. art. 4, § 1, 18.
24. The powers and duties of the secretary of agriculture are provided for by §§ 1701-
1711 of the Administrative Code. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 441-451 (Purdon 1962).
25. PA. CONST. art. 4, §§ 1, 4.1, 8.
26. [S]ection [512 of the Administrative Code] expressly provides that 'it shall be
the duty of the department. . . having requested and received [such] legal advice
from the department of justice regarding the official duty of such department...
to follow the same,' unless, as the court below specifies in its judgment 'the
constitutionality of a statute . . . is involved.'
The commonwealth court also emphasized dictum in Lewis that the
attorney general has authority to deal with administrative matters only.
27
The Lewis court stated that, aside from asking advice whenever it is
desired, the only matters required to be submitted to the attorney general
are
(I) administrative questions of a legal nature affecting the har-
mony which should exist between two or more of the executive
departments of the state; (2) doubtful legal questions, not there-
tofore passed upon by the courts or the Attorney General,
which affect any state officer's performance of his official
duties; and (3) proceedings which have resulted or likely will
result in litigation in which the State is interested.2"
In that sweeping language, the supreme court construed the attorney
general's authority to extend well beyond simple "administrative" ques-
tions. It limited that term strictly to the type of issue before it in Lewis-
legal questions affecting the harmony between two or more of the execu-
tive state agencies. The issues in Hetherington, however, arguably fall
within all three categories. First, the relationship between the secretary of
agriculture and the statutory committee erected to appropriate and expend
state funds is an administrative question of a legal nature affecting two
state agencies. 9 Merely because the constitution is relevant to the ques-
tion does not, in and of itself, render the matter nonadministrative.
Second, the secretary of agriculture's performance of his official duties
depends largely on whether the act in question is constitutional. Third
when there is a strong question of constitutionality, litigation is likely to
result. The Commonwealth has a strong interest in that litigation since it
affects not only the duties of the secretary of agriculture, but also the
powers of the attorney general and General Assembly. Accordingly,
Lewis fails to support the commonwealth court's contention that the
statutory duties of the attorney general preclude him from directing a state
agency to refuse to follow a statute believed to be unconstitutional.
2. The Attorney General's Common-Law Powers .- Although the
Hetherington court recognized the breadth of the attorney general's
common-law powers,30 it nevertheless concluded that the direction by the
Commonwealth ex rel. Woodruff v. Lewis, 282 Pa. 306, 315, 127 A. 828, 831 (1925), quoted
in Hetherington v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 509, 311 A.2d 162, 166 (1973).
27. Id. In Lewis, the court stressed that the narrow issue before it was the auditor
general's duty to follow the attorney general's interpretation of a statute when no question
of constitutionality is involved.
In so far as our opinion goes beyond this restricted inquiry, it does so at the request
of the litigants, in order that similar difficulties may be avoided,' that state cred-
itors, like all others, may have 'right and justice administered [to them] without
sale, denial or delay,' and that harmony may reign where discord seems now to
prevail.
Commonwealth ex rel. Woodruff v. Lewis, 282 Pa. 306, 310, 127 A. 828, 829 (1925).
28. Id. at 317-18, 127 A. at 832.
29. Questions concerning how the committee is to act and how the members of the
committee are to be appointed are clearly administrative questions, and as such, are
properly referred to the attorney general for his legal advice.
30. 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 509-10, 311 A.2d at 166. The common-law powers of the
state's chief law officer to ignore a statute would amount to a "suspen-
sion" 31 of that statute in direct contravention of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution.32 The assumption, however, that a direction to ignore a statute
is a constitutional "suspension" of that statute is tenuous. A legal
opinion that explains the disharmony between a law and the constitution
under which that law is enacted is hardly the type of unilateral and
arbitrary action that our forefathers feared in the executive branch.
33
Rather, it is little more than an invitation to litigation. The final decision
of the constitutionality of the statute rests, as it should, with the
judiciary.
34
Under the Hetherington court's broad definition of the word "sus-
pend," a state officer who is sworn to uphold the state and federal
constitutions would be barred from implementing that oath by refusing to
comply with a statute that he believes to be unconstitutional, for such an
action would be a unilateral "suspension" of that statute. But this is
precisely the type of conduct that the supreme court condoned in the
Lewis case. 3 Thus, the commonwealth court has managed both to accept
and reject the Lewis case simultaneously.
Even if the attorney general's direction to ignore a statute because of
constitutional deficiencies is considered a "suspension" of that statute,
his order is not necessarily violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
because the state constitution expressly provides that the power to sus-
attorney general are illustrated in Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952) (as
chief law enforcement officer attorney general is charged with the over-all duty of enforcing
the Commonwealth's laws); Margiotti Appeal, 365 Pa. 330, 75 A.2d 465 (1950) (Pennsylvania
Attorney General clothed with powers that enveloped attorney general at common law);
Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation Proceedings (No. 1), 332 Pa. 289, 2 A.2d 783
(1938); Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 A. 524 (1936). But see
Commonwealth v. Schab, - Pa. -, 383 A.2d 819 (1978).
31. In Bishop v. Bacon, 130 Pa. Super. Ct. 240, 247, 196 A.918, 921 (1938), the word
"suspend" was defined to mean "to cause to cease for a time; to postpone." Admittedly,
the attorney general's direction to the secretary of agriculture in Hetherington to refuse to
recognize various individuals as members of the committee operated to "postpone" the
effect of the statute establishing the committee, see notes 13-14 supra, but it is noteworthy
that in Bishop, the court made no attempt to define "suspend" in the constitutional sense. It
merely distinguished that word from the word "supersede" to determine the effect of an
amendment to the School Code of 1911. Id. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the mere
direction to ignore a given statute is a constitutional "suspension" of that statute.
32. "No power of suspending laws shall be exercised unless by the Legislature or by
its authority." PA. CONST. art. I, § 12. This provision of the constitution can be traced back
to the practice in England before the Revolution of 1688, in which
it was not uncommon for the King to suspend the operation or execution of laws
for the purpose of carrying out some temporary and arbitrary intention of his own.
Such action was really illegal, and in fraud of the rights of the citizens, but was
nevertheless persisted in until finally forbidden by the [English) Bill of Rights,
providing 'That the pretended power of suspending of laws, by regal authority,
without consent of Parliament, is illegal.' In order that executive authority (of
which there was great jealousy at the foundation of our constitutional government)
might be deprived of the power ever to suspend laws, a provision forbidding any
power except the Legislature to do so, was made a part of our fundamental law in
1790 (Art. IX, § 12), and has remained a part of it ever since.
T. WHITE, CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 161 (1907).
33. See note 32 supra.
34. See PA. CONST. art. 5, § I.
35. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
pend laws can be delegated, 36 and the legislature may have done so by
adoption of section 512 of the Administrative Code.37
After concluding that the attorney general had neither statutory nor
common-law power to direct a state official to refuse to comply with a
statute believed to be unconstitutional, the Hetherington court acknowl-
edged that the attorney general does have a limited right to consider
constitutional questions. The court observed that the chief law officer
may exercise this right by (1) instituting litigation to support his views;
(2) preparing legislation to support his views; and (3) in some limited
instances, such as when the United States Supreme Court has spoken, to
determine that the High Court's opinion is controlling in Pennsylvania."8
III. Historical Relationship of Attorney General to Unconstitutional
Statutes
A brief review of the last hundred years discloses that attorneys
general have ruled statutes to be unconstitutionally unenforceable and
have advocated such positions in litigation. As early as 1876, the attorney
general ruled a statute unconstitutional.39 In his opinion, Attorney Gener-
al Lear stated, "[i]t is my duty as well as my official obligation to
,support, obey and defend the Constitution.' In this case, I have no
doubts.' -4
A similar question was brought to Attorney General Palmer some
five years later. He referred to previous opinions holding parts of a certain
36. See note 32 supra.
37. See note 16 supra. The delegation of the authority to suspend laws is not con-
sidered a delegation of law-making power.
The making of laws is purely a legislative act, but the determination by some
agency when, if ever, their operation shall be suspended, has never been so
considered. . . .Acting under the authority of the legislature, the Supreme Court,
by promulgating a rule of practice which may be inconsistent with some statute, is
merely declaring the event upon which the expressed will of the legislature is to
take effect. The actual suspension is the act of the legislature.
Blair Motor Car Co. v. Mervine, 48 Pa. D. & C. 351, 353-54 (C.P. Bed. 1943). See also
Young v. Fetterolf, 320 Pa. 289, 182 A. 676 (1936).
38. If the Attorney General in his opinion believes that a statute is unconstitution-
al, he has the right and indeed the duty to either cause to be initiated an action in
the Courts of this Commonwealth and thus obtain judicial determination of the
issue or he may prepare, for submission to the General Assembly, such revision of
the statute as he may deem advisable. [Citation omitted]
There may exist an exception in those instances where the Supreme Court of
the United States has declared unconstitutional a statute of another jurisdiction,
which statute is the same as or similar to the Pennsylvania statute in all important
aspects. In such instances, the Attorney General being of the opinion that the
United States Supreme Court decision is controlling as to a Pennsylvania statute,
may implement that judicial decision. We do not mean to suggest that in all cases
the Attorney General should enjoy this latitude, only in those cases when the
applicability of the U.S. Supreme Court decision to a Pennsylvania statute is clear
and unequivocal.
10 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 511-12, 311 A.2d at 167.
39. Commonwealth ex rel. Wolfe v. Butler, 99 Pa. 535, 538 (1882).
40. Opinion of Attorney General George Lear dated 9 December 1876. A copy is in the
author's files.
act to be unconstitutional. He stated "by those opinions I propose to
abide until convinced of error by the Court of last resort. "41
It is the right of a private citizen to question the constitu-
tionality of any act of assembly that infringes upon his rights
and bring it before the courts for adjudication. It is the duty of a
public officer who is sworn to support, obey and defend the
constitution to raise such a question and procure judicial deter-
mination whenever required to pay out public money under acts
which he is properly advised are not sanctioned by the
Constitution .42
Although the Supreme Court later held that both attorneys general
had been in error on the merits, 43 significantly, it did not comment at all
upon their actions in ruling the statutes unconstitutional. It is also
noteworthy that there is no indication that the members of the General
Assembly, who were suing the executive branch for additional compensa-
tion, argued that the attorney general acted beyond his authority.'
History repeated itself in 1932, when Attorney General Schnader not
only advised the governor that certain welfare legislation was unconstitu-
tional, but implemented that advice with an opinion directing the secre-
tary of welfare to refuse to draw any requisitions under the act.45 Al-
though the supreme court ultimately disagreed with the attorney general's
position," it once again refused to comment on the attorney general's
power either to issue an opinion holding a statute unconstitutional or to
argue that position in court.
Attorneys general themselves were divided on the extent of their
own authority. In the early part of the twentieth century, a conservative
view was advanced by Attorneys General Carson,47 Todd,
48 and Bell, 49
41. Opinion of Attorney General Henry W. Palmer dated 9 June 1881. A copy is in the
author's files.
42. Id. Accordingly, the state treasurer was advised to refuse to make certain pay-
ments to members of the General Assembly.
43. Commonwealth ex rel. Wolfe v. Butler, 99 Pa. 535 (1882).
44. See id. at 536-38.
45. PA. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. 37 (1931-1932), supplementing PA. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No.
30 (1931-1932) and PA. AT-r'y GEN. Op. No. 32-D (1931-1932).
46. Commonwealth ex reL. Schnader v, Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 A. 697 (1932).
Though the supreme court avoided comment on the attorney general's authority, it did refer
to Attorney General Schnader as "one of the ablest constitutional lawyers in the State." Id.
at 78, 161 A. at 711.
47. In Brown v. Dairy & Food Comm'r, 1905-06 PA. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. 398, 15
Pa.D. 829 (1906), the attorney general permitted the use of the name of the Commonwealth
in a quo warranto proceeding to test he constitutionality of an act of assembly creating a
public office, but cautioned, "As I am not a judicial officer, I am without power or right o
determine [judicial questions]. The sole question for me is whether the issue sought to be
raised can be presented to a court and determined in quo warranto proceedings." Id. at 399,
15 Pa.D. at 830. A suit was brought and thereafter defended by the attorney general.
48. 1909-10 PA. ArT'Y GEN. Op. No. 264, 13 Dauph. 49 (1909). In this opinion, the
attorney general wrote that [tlhis Department does not assume that any Act of Assembly is
unconstitutional before the courts have so declared and you [a state official receiving
advice] are justified in acting upon the assumption that the Act in question is constitutional
until it is otherwise delcared by the Courts of the State." Id. at 265, 13 Dauph. at 50.
49. Mothers' Pensions, 1913-14 PA. A-r'Y GEN. Op. No. 47, 41 Pa.C. 216 (1913).
Attorney General Bell advised the auditor general that
and by Attorney General Reno in 1940. ° On the other hand, Attorneys
General Cohen, 51 McBride, 52 and Alpern53 unhesitatingly issued opinions
advising that legislation was unconstitutional.
53a
In recent years, attorneys general have adopted the latter view by
exercising their powers more independently through opinion and advoca-
cy, which undoubtedly led to President Judge Bowman's alacrity in
Hetherington .5 The springboard may well have been Attorney General
Speaker's "midnight" opinion in 1971 that declared punishment by
electrocution unconstitutional. 55 Thereafter, through the end of 1977,
twenty-seven opinions have been issued advising state officials to disre-
gard various laws because the attorney general deemed them unconstitu-
tional.
This explosion of opinions, however, is not so revolutionary as it
might first appear. Six opinions dealt with legislation nullified by the
equal rights amendment and thus presented only questions of statutory
[a]fter an act of assembly has been certified to the governor as having been duly
passed by both houses and has received the approval of the governor, this depart-
ment has, of course, no jurisdiction or authority to pronounce it unconstitutional-
that power being exclusively vested in the judiciary. As every act duly passed and
approved is presumed to be contitutional until a court of competent jurisdiction has
pronounced it unconstitutional, an expression of the opinion of this department at
this time would serve no good purpose, as such opinion would not be binding upon
any individual or any department of the state government.
Id. at 51, 41 Pa.C. at 221. The attorney general did suggest, however, that if the auditor
general had "substantial doubt" of the constitutionality of the act in question, he should
decline to comply with the act so that the matter could be litigated. Id. at 52, 41 Pa. C. at
222.
50. See PA. AT-r'Y GEN. Op. No. 325, 37 Pa. D. & C. 529, 530 (1940) (Department of
Justice has no authority to pass on constitutionality of legislation); PA. Arr'W GEN. Op. No.
320, 38 Pa. D. & C. 129, 137 (1940) (Department of Justice has no authority to pass on
constitutionality of legislation).
51. Id. No. 664 (1955-1956) (statute providing for mandatory increases to all profes-
sional employees of school districts contravenes Pennsylvania Constitution); id. No. 655
(statute permitting increased annuities to former state employees violates Pennsylvania
Constitution).
52. Id. No. 16 (1957) (language in appropriation act that repeals prior statutes violates
Pennsylvania Constitution); id. No. 14 (1957) (restriction of deer hunting permits to county
residents contravenes equal protection clause); id. No. 7 (1957) (restriction in appropriation
act unconstitutional).
53. Id. No. 237 (1961) (language in appropriation act violates Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion).
53a. Attorney General Brown successfully argued the unconstitutionality of a law
permitting a suit against the commonwealth as special legislation in Collins v. Common-
wealth, 262 Pa. 572, 106 A. 229 (1919). No opinion has been found taking this position; it was
just asserted in the litigation.
54. Hetherington v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (1973), rev'd, 458
Pa. 479, 329 A.2d 250 (1974).
55. In a strongly worded directive, Attorney General Speaker ordered the removal of
the electric chair from the Rockview State Correctional Institution just before he left office.
PA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. I at 3 (1971). Though the attorney general recognized that the death
penalty had never been considered "cruel and unusual punishment" by the Supreme Court,
he further observed that "[t]he failure of the Supreme Court to act does not preclude state
executive action. On the contrary, the Attorney General's oath 'to support, obey and defend
the Constitution' obliges him to determine and act upon a constitutional mandate when the
Court remains silent." Id. This opinion was quickly reversed by Attorney General Creamer.
"If the death penalty in Pennsylvania is to be abolished at this time, such action should be
taken, either by the Legislature by repeal or by a court of competent jurisdiction declaring
the death penalty unconstitutional." Id.
construction. 56 Another eleven opinions, premised upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Graham v. Richardson,57 declared American citizen-
ship requirements for various licenses and other governmental benefits to
be unconstitutional. 58 Four of the remaining opinions met Hetherington's
third criterion59 by advising that United States or Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decisions applied to Pennsylvania law in such areas as durational
residency requirements,' loyalty oaths, 6 1 veterans' preference,62 and field
trip transportation for nonpublic school children. 63 Another three opin-
ions dealt with the continuing ability of the insurance commissioner and
auditor general to sit on boards that they were required to audit, in light of
a recently adopted change in the constitution.
64
56. Id. No. 6, 6 Pa.B 796 (1976) (act providing for benefits to widows of Common-
wealth employees must be construed to include widowers as well under equal rights
amendment); id. No. 30, 5 Pa.B. 2736 (1975) (statute that forbids an official prison visitor
from interviewing member of opposite sex violates equal rights amendment); id. No. 41, 3
Pa.B. 1185 (1973) (statute prohibiting boxing and wrestling licenses to females unconstitu-
tional under equal rights amendment); id. No., 150, 2 Pa.B. 1916 (1972) (law that prohibits
parole officers of one sex to supervise parolees of opposite sex unconstitutional under equal
rights amendment); id. No. 71 (1971) (statute that prohibits females from ages twelve
through twenty-one to carry newspapers contravenes equal rights amendment); id. No. 69
(limiting cosmetologists to the care of women's hair only violates equal rights amendment).
57. 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect and,
therefore, subject to strict judicial scrutiny). See also In re Griffith, 413 U.S. 717 (1974)
(Connecticut statute that denies resident aliens the right to take bar examination violates
equal protection clause); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1974) (state may not require
United States citizenship as a condition precedent to employment with the state).
58. PA. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. 48, 4 Pa.B. 2152 (1974) (Liquor Code unconstitutional
insofar as it imposes United States citizenship requirements on the officers, directors, and
shareholders of corporate applicants for liquor licenses); id. No. 23, 4 Pa.B. 964 (1974)
(Liquor Control Board cannot constitutionally revoke license of corporate licensee for
employing aliens as officers of corporate licensee); id. No. 16, 4 Pa.B. 679 (1974) (state may
not impose citizenship requirement upon inspector of boilers and unfired pressure vessels);
id. No. 52, 3 Pa.B. 2154 (1973) (citizenship and state residency requirements for licensure of
public weighmasters unconstitutional under equal protection and privilege and immunities
clauses); id. No. 9, 3 Pa.B. 204 (1973) (citizenship requirement imposed for teaching in
public schools constitutionally invalid); id. No. 4, 3 Pa.B. 201 (1973) (citizenship require-
ment imposed for participation in scholarship program unconstitutional); id. No. 116, 2
Pa. B. 745 (1972) (citizenship requirement for licensure of nurses unconstitutional); id. No.
114, 2 Pa.B. 635 (1972) (citizenship requirement for licensure of pharmacists unconstitution-
al); id. No. 113, 2 Pa.B. 635 (1972) (citizenship requirements for licensure of physicians
unconstitutional); id. No. 112, 2 Pa.B. 634 (1972) (citizenship requirements for licensure of
real estate brokers unconstitutional); id. No. 92 (1971) (citizenship requirements for licen-
sure of veterinarians unconstitutional).
59. 'See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
60. PA. Ar-r's GEN. Op. No. 121, 2 Pa.B. 874 (1972) (durational residency require-
ments imposed as qualifications for electors unconstitutional under Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972)).
61. PA. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. 2, 5 Pa.B. 214(1975) (loyalty oath unconstitutional under
Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441 (1974)).
62. PA. ATr'v GEN. Op. No. 17, 6 Pa.B. 1521 (1976) (veterans' preferences in public
employment unconstitutional under Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer v. O'Neill, 368 Pa. 369,
83 A.2d 832 (1951) and Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d 701
(1938)).
63. PA. ATr'e GEN. Op. No. 15, 7 Pa.B. 2674 (1977) (field trip transportation statute
for nonpublic school students unconstitutional under Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977)).
64. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1968, "[any Commonwealth officer
whose approval is necessary for any transaction relative to the financial affairs of the
Commonwealth shall not be charged with the function of auditing that transaction after its
occurrence.'" PA. CONST. art. 8, § 10. Because of this constitutional provision, the insurance
Only three of these twenty-seven opinions are truly independent
constitutional analyses of legislation. The first of these opinions65 is the
one examined by the commonwealth and supreme courts in Hethering-
ton .66 The second opinion, which dealt with the authority of the General
Assembly to appropriate federal funds, was clearly designed to set the
stage for litigation. 6' The third opinion scrutinized the power of the
General Assembly to reenact the general appropriation act for the follow-
ing year.68
Notwithstanding the commonwealth court's alarm in Hethering-
ton,69 therefore, the attorney general's power to direct state officials to
disregard unconstitutional laws is being exercised in a limited number of
areas only. Moreover, there are abundant grounds upon which this au-
thority can be based.7 °
IV. Rational Basis for the Attorney General's Authority
The attorney general is a constitutional officer 7' clothed with broad
powers under law. The Department of Justice, which he heads,7 2 repre-
sents the interests of the Commonwealth. 73 The attorney general is "the
chief law officer of the Commonwealth." 74 He is the "legal advisor of
the Governor, in the performance of his official duties," 75 and has the
power to bind any department, board, commission, or officer of state
government with his legal advice. 76 He supervises, directs, and controls
all of the legal business of every administrative department, board, and
commission of the state government and represents the Commonwealth in
any litigation to which the Commonwealth is a party or may be permitted
or required by law to intervene or interplead. 77 Similar powers and duties
commissioner was precluded from simultaneously serving on and auditing the Workmen's
Insurance Fund, see PA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 44, 5 Pa.B. 3245 (1975), and the Coal and Clay
Mine Subsidence Insurance Board, see id. No. 38, 5 Pa.B. 3005 (1975), and the auditor
general was advised that he could not both serve on and audit the Board of Commissioners
of Public Grounds and Buildings, see id. No. 9, 7 Pa.B. 1277 (1977).
65. See note 13 supra.
66. Hetherington v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (1973), rev'd, 458
Pa. 479, 329 A.2d 250 (1974).
67. PA. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 21, 6 Pa.B. 1705 (1976) (statute prohibiting state
treasurer from issuing warrant for requisitioned federal funds unless such funds have been
specifically appropriated by the legislature violates both state and federal constitutions).
These statutes, however, have passed constitutional muster under the Commonwealth
court's decision in Shapp v. Sloan, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 312, 367 A.2d 791 (1976), aff'd July
1978, No. 214 January term 1977.
68. PA. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. 19A,(1977) (attempt to reenact general appropriation act
for next year is unconstitutional and may be disregarded).
69. Hetherington v. MeHale, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (1973).
70. See notes 71-101 and accompanying text infra.
71. PA. CONST. art. 4, §§ 1, 4.1, 8.
72. Administrative Code, § 206, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 66 (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
73. Administrative Code, § 903(b), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 192 (Purdon 1962).
74. Administrative Code, § 704, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 244 (Purdon 1962).
75. Id.
76. Administrative Code, § 512, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 192 (Purdon 1962).
77. Administrative Code, §§ 902-903, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 292-293 (Purdon
1962).
are conferred upon the Department of Justice.78 In Commonwealth ex rel.
Minerd v. Margiotti, 9 the court stated,
The Code of 1929 places the Attorney General at the head of the
Department of Justice, the most responsible post in state gov-
ernment after that of the Governor. Section 904 (71 P.S. § 294)
provides: 'The Department of Justice shall have the power, and
its duty shall be, with the approval of the Governor: (a) To
investigate any violations, or alleged violations, of the laws of
the Commonwealth which may come to its notice; (b) To take
such steps, and adopt such means, as may be reasonably neces-
sary to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth.' This enjoins
upon the Attorney General some of the most important duties in
the conduct of government and could never have been intended
to lessen his powers to achieve the purposes contemplated or the
ends desired. o
Moreover, the Attorney General has the right under state law to
intervene on behalf of the Commonwealth in any case in which the
Commonwealth or any officer of the Commonwealth may have any
interest.81
In recognition of his role as the chief legal officer of the Common-
wealth, various rules of procedure provide that in any proceeding in
which an act of assembly is alleged to be unconstitutional and in which
the Commonwealth is not a party, the party raising the question of
constitutionality shall promptly give notice to the attorney general, who
may intervene as a party or may be heard without the necessity of
intervention.8 2 Under these rules the attorney general is not mandated to
defend the constitutionality of a statute, but must be advised when a
challenge is made. The determination whether to intervene and, if so,
what position to take, is a matter for his discretion.
In addition to the statutory powers of the attorney general the
supreme court has held that he is clothed with broad common-law pow-
ers.83 These ancient powers have usually been examined in a criminal-law
setting to determine the attorney general's right to supersede local district
attorneys,8 but are nevertheless bottomed on the broad degree of respon-
sible discretion with which he is clothed. This broad discretion was
recognized by the supreme court well over one hundred years ago in
Commonwealth v. Burrell.5 "The Office of the Attorney General is a
public trust, which involves, on the discharge of it, the exercise of an
78. Administrative Code, §§ 901-908, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 291-298 (Purdon
1962).
79. 325 Pa. 17, 188 A. 524 (1936).
80. Id. at 33-34, 188 A. at 531 (emphasis added). But see Commonwealth v. Schab, -
Pa. -, 383 A.2d 819 (1978).
81. Act of May 28, 1915, P.L. 616, No. 266 (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 145 (Purdon
1953)).
82. PA. R.C.P. 235; PA. R.A.P. 521.
83. See note 30 supra.
84. But.,tee Commonwealth v. Schab, - Pa. -.. 383 A.2d 819 (1978).
85. 7 Pa. 34 (1847).
almost boundless discretion by an officer who stands as impartial as a
judge. ..... 86
In the context of his role as chief law officer of the Commonwealth,
issues regarding the constitutionality of state statutes often come before
him. The attorney general's position in response to these questions cannot
be an unfailing positive Pavlovian one. He has taken an oath to "support,
obey, and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitu-
tion of this Commonwealth and [to] discharge the duties of [his] office
with fidelity." ,87 In some cases the question will be governed by decisions
of the Pennsylvania or federal courts .8 In other cases, while there may be
no one case that determines the issue, the attorney general will conclude
upon his study of an issue on review before him that a statute is uncon-
stitutional. 89 How then is the Commonwealth's attorney to act in such a
case? To answer this question, one must first consider what effect the
opinion of the attorney general has and what it means to advise that a
statute is unconstitutional.
Attorneys have the right to advise their clients. Often an attorney
will advise a client that a statute is probably unconstitutional and that the
client is, therefore, justified in disregarding it in taking his actions. 89a The
attorney will undoubtedly advise the client that there is some risk in so
doing absent a declaration of unconstitutionality by a court with juris-
diction.
That is all the attorney general does when he advises one of his
clients that in his opinion a statute is constitutional. This is not advice to
the public and is not an encroachment on the judicial function. It is legal
advice to the official who must be advised how to conduct himself under
the constitution and statutes of the Commonwealth.
The advice of unconstitutionality given to the official does
not suspend or abrogate the statute. It tells the official that,
unless otherwise ordered by a court he may disregard a statu-
86. fd. at 39 (quoting Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Barr 187, 189 (1845)). In BurreU, an
individual attempted to bring a quo warranto proceeding in face of a statute which said it
"may be issued upon the suggestion of the Attorney General." The court held that the
individual could not bring the proceeding and the individual then contended that the attorney
general was required by the statute to bring it. The court held that this too was incorrect; not
only was the attorney general the only one who could bring the action, he was the only one
to decide whether the quo warranto should be brought in the exercise of his discretion. This
holding raised the obvious objection that since the governor appointed the attorney general
and had appointed the office-holder whose right was being challenged, it was unlikely that
the attorney general would bring a quo warranto proceeding against him. The court an-
swered that issue by stating that the attorney general was deemed to be a person of integrity
and as an officer of the state would exercise his duty with proper discretion. To conclude
otherwise, the court determined, "would deprive the Attorney General of his official
discretion, and compel him to act against the dictates of his judgment .... " 7 Pa. at 40.
87. Administrative Code, § 218, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 78 (Purdon 1962). See also
PA. CONST. art. 4, § 3. A specific oath for the attorney general that predates the Pennsylva-
nia Constitution of 1874 can be found at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 813 (Purdon 1962).
88. See notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 64-68 and accompanying text supra.
89a. This conduct is expressly sanctioned by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
See EC7-5 (lawyer as adviser serves client's interests by giving professional opinion of the
ultimate decision likely to be rendered by the courts on the matter at hand).
tory provision. Such an opinion is in no way binding upon the
public. The law is still on the books . . . . [A]ny aggrieved
person has a right to go to court to test the propriety of the
official's conduct. It is for this reason that the opinion of the
Attorney General refers to the obligation of the public official
to disregard a provision believed to be unconstitutional and
does not make a bald declaration of unconstitutionality.' °
The advice that an attorney general should be empowered to give
must be considered in conjunction with the general rule that an important
official may refuse to perform a nonministerial task because the statute
purporting to impose the duty is unconstitutional. 9' If a state officer has
the authority to conclude that a statute is unconstitutional, a fortiori he
has the right to seek advice from the chief law officer of the state on the
question and rely on that advice. Concomitantly, the chief law officer has
the right to render that advice.
What is the effect of that advice? It is a declaration that an act passed
by the General Assembly falls afoul of the constitution adopted by the
people. The act, therefore, cannot stand in face of the superior provision.
In Emerick v. Harris,92 the seminal Pennsylvania case confronting this
issue, the court stressed the oath taken by the judiciary to support the
federal and state constitutions. Justice Yeates construed the obligation of
this oath as follows:
Whether the party moves in the sphere of the Legislative,
Executive or Judicial department, he is bound to maintain and
uphold those compacts made with the people. Possessed of a
portion of the lawmaking power, he is interdicted from exercis-
ing his legislative right in such a manner as may injure or impair
the sources from which his authority is derived. In the Execu-
tive branch he shall carefully avoid every act which may have
that injurious tendency. In the Judiciary, he shall fairly and
patiently compare legislative acts with both the constitutions
and honestly pronounce upon them as his judgment and con-
science shall dictate, without regarding consequences.93
For members of the Executive branch to fulfull their oath to support the
constitution, as suggested by Justice Yeates, the attorney general must
necessarily be authorized to advise those officers when they are violating
that document.
Justice Yeates also stated in Emerick that though he had drawn his
opinion before Marbury v. Madison94 was published, Chief Justice
Marshall's observations confirmed his own sentiments. 95 The observa-
90. Brief for Appellant at 30-31, Hetherington v. McHale, 458 Pa. 479, 329 A.2d 250
(1974), rev'g 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162 (1973).
91. Huntington v. Worthum, 120 U.S. 97 (1887); Commonwealth ex rel. Woodruff v.
Snyder, 279 Pa. 234, 123 A. 792 (1924); Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v.
Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 390, 59 A. 961, 968-69 (1904); Note, The Power ofa State Officer to
Raise a Constitutional Question, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 1036 (1933); See notes 19-26 and
accompanying text supra.
92. 1 Barr 416 (1808).
93. Id. at 424 (emphasis in original).
94. 5"U.S. 87 (1803).
95. 1 Barr at 423-24.
tions of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison regarding the
duty of a judicial official to examine the Constitution when reaching a
judicial decision9 6 are applicable to an executive official who carries out
executive functions, such as administration of a law relegated to him, or,
in the case of an attorney, advising the official how to administer that law
or whether the law is unconstitutional.
An apt example may be seen in a comparison of the Pennsylvania
equal rights amendment 97 with the Human Relations Act98 insofar as both
preclude discrimination based on sex. The Human Relations Act also
contains a section repealing or suspending any inconsistent law. 99 When
confronted, therefore, with a statute that provided that no person of one
sex shall be paroled in charge of a parole officer of the opposite sex, 00
the attorney general was bound to review the validity of that law, which
had been passed in 1941, in view of the later passage of the Human
Relations Act. The issue before him was a typical issue of statutory
construction, i.e., whether a later passed statute had, by its terms and
provisions, impliedly repealed or otherwise superseded an older law. It
could hardly be argued that this was not within his duties as set forth in
the Administrative Code. But that was the very analysis that was also
necessary under the equal rights amendment. Yet, according to the
opinion of the commonwealth court in Hetherington, it might be held that
the attorney general had no right to refer to the provisions of the equal
rights amendment, even though the analysis was in effect the same. When
faced with the problem, the attorney general did rule the section in
violation of both the Human Relations Act and the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 
101
One may conclude, therefore, that the attorney general, as part of his
official duties, does have the authority to advise a state official that a
particular law that he administers is not in harmony with the Pennsylvania
Constitution and should, therefore, be disregarded or modified to comply
with the Constitution. It goes without saying that this authority should be
used sparingly and only when the attorney general is clearly convinced of
the conclusion.
V. How Constitutional Issues Arise and How They Should be Resolved
How and when the attorney general's authority to advise that a
statute is unconstitutional should be employed depends upon the manner
96. 5 U.S. at 109-113.
97. PA. CONST. ART. 1, § 28.
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 951 (Purdon 1964).
99. Id. § 962(a) (Purdon Supp. 1977-78).
100. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.28 (Purdon 1964).
101. PA. A-r'y GEN. Op. No. 150, 2 Pa.B. 1916 (1972) (Parole Act inconsistent with
both Human Relations Act and equal rights amendment). But cf. id. No. 9, 4 Pa.B. 334
(1974) (since provisions of Unemployment Compensation Law are impliedly repealed by
Human Relations Act, necessity to examine equal rights amendment is obviated).
in which the issue arises. The constitutionality of a statute may be
addressed by the attorney general in any one of three settings, which he
may often, but not always, control. First, he may be asked to render an
official opinion regarding specific legislation. 10 2 Second, he may be
advised that a suit has been instituted to challenge the constitutionality of
a statute.10 3 Third, he may initiate or join in a suit to establish the
constitutional invalidity of a statute.'14
A. Opinions
The attorney general should have the right to render his opinions
regarding constitutionality to the members of the executive branch of
government whom he binds with his advice. 0 5 In so doing, he acts as a
normal attorney. When he is free of doubt, he advises them, and upholds
the statute. When he is convinced, however, that a statute is unconstitu-
tional, he should have the right to advise the executive official of this
conclusion insofar as it governs the official's duties. This power is an
outgrowth of the attorney general's responsibility to advise state officials
regarding their duties and functions. This does not mean that he has the
power to declare statutes unconstitutional. Moreover, the attorney general
must always begin with the presumption of constitutionality.
The attorney general also has the right to review and decide the
legality of regulations promulgated by state agencies under the Common-
wealth Documents Law. 106 He may often conclude that a regulation is
unconstitutional and issue an opinion to that effect. 1°7 If a statute is
thereafter passed identical to the regulation held invalid there would seem
to be no reason why he could not issue such an opinion.
Normally, the ruling on unconstitutionality is reviewable by a court
and by an aggrieved party. It must be conceded, however, that there may
be instances in which no one would have standing to raise the issue,
except, perhaps, members of the legislature.1'8 For example, in a series
102. See notes 105-111 and accompanying text infra.
103. See notes 112-116 and accompanying text infra.
104. See notes 117-121 and accompanying text infra.
105. See DiNubile v. Kent, 466 Pa. 572, 353 A.2d 839 (1976).
106. Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 769, No. 240, § 101 (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 1101
(Purdon Supp. 1977-78)). Section 205 of the Commonwealth Documents Law requires the
attorney general to approve the legality of all proposed administrative regulations, and,
unless the agency is independent from the control of the governor, the attorney general's
decision that a proposed regulation is illegal is final. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 1205 (Purdon
Supp. 1977-78).
107. See, e.g., PA. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. 16, 5 Pa.B. 1383 (1975) (proposed regulations
on discrimination with respect to abortion and sterilization in public hospitals contravene
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)); PA. Arr'y GEN. Op. No. 13,4 Pa.B. 488 (1974) (school
board regulations of teachers' hair styles unconstitutional under Stull v. School Bd., 459 2d
339 (3d Cir. 1972)); PA. Arr'v GEN. Op. No. 57, 3 Pa.B. 2210 (1973) (state police minimum
height requirements unconstitutionally discriminate against Spanish-surnamed and female
applicants).
108. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the legislature's agricultural committee filed an
amicus curiae brief in Hetherington v. McHale, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 501, 311 A.2d 162
(1973).
of opinions the attorney general has held that various licenses and
privileges requiring that a person be a citizen of the United States are
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause. 09 It is unclear that any
member of the public has the standing to challenge these rulings, but it is
clear that a person aggrieved by a contrary ruling would have had
standing. On balance it would seem that these opinions were justified,
given the status of the law when they were rendered and because it saves
individuals the expense of litigating the constitutional issue once the
attorney general has concluded, on precedent, that the law was uncon-
stitutional.
An interesting issue can arise when the governor vetoes a particular
piece of legislation because of the attorney general's opinion that the bill
in question is unconstitutional. If that legislation is then passed over the
governor's veto, what right and duty does the attorney general have to
defend it? Or, put in another way, how can he defend a law having once
opined that it is unconstitutional? The attorney general can solve this
problem by retaining outside counsel clearly committed to the constitu-
tional validity of the statute to defend it. 110 Though this particular resolu-
tion of the problem is not binding precedent for future cases, it should
nevertheless serve notice that the attorney general has a right, after having
counseled the chief executive to veto a bill because it is unconstitutional,
to urge the unconstitutionality of that bill in court and to so advise state
officials. I I I
B. Defensive Litigation
When the Commonwealth is a party to an action, and the attorney
general agrees with the plaintiff's contention that the statute at issue is
unconstitutional, the danger arises that the court will be denied the
advantage of having advocates on both sides of the issue. It is one thing to
have a civil case in which the parties compromise, and another to have a
case in which the compromise includes a declaration of unconstitutionali-
ty. One way to obviate this problem is to attempt to find an adverse party
in interest.
For example, the constitutionality of a provision in the Administra-
tive Code automatically placing the president of a private professional
society on the state licensing board was raised as a defense in a license
109. See note 56 supra.
110. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), for example, the Attorney
General refused to defend a suit instituted by government employees discharged by
Congress as purported security risks. The Attorney General commented, "In these circum-
stances I feel that Congress should be afforded an opportunity to be represented by their
own counsel. . . . I find it impossible to advocate with conviction the views of the
Congress." H.R. REP. No. 1117, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1944). In Planned Parenthood
Assoc. v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975) judgment vacated sub. nom. Beal v.
Franklin, 428 U.S. 901 (1976), the Pennsylvania Attorney General retained outside counsel
to defend the validity of Pennsylvania's abortion law.
I 1l. See Commonwealth ex rel Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 A. 697 (1932).
suspension case." 2 The dentist alleged that since the board was uncon-
stitutionally composed, it could not rightfully suspend his license. The
attorney general agreed that the provision was unconstitutional, but ar-
gued successfully that the rule of de facto officers precluded the licensee
from raising this issue in the context of a license suspension case. When
the matter was initially argued before the commonwealth court, that court
expressed great concern with the position of the attorney general because
there was no party before it to defend the constitutionality of the stat-
ute." 3 This problem was obviated when the attorney general thereafter
brought a direct action in quo warranto against the president of the society
predicated on the unconstitutionality of the statute. The suit was success-
ful, and the president was ousted.
14
On the other hand, there are instances when, in the course of
litigation, it becomes apparent to the attorney general that the statute is
indeed unconstitutional. In such cases, with the approbation of the
court, there have been opinions written so concluding, which resolved the
litigation. " 5 The latter type of case presents a growing tendency in the
federal courts that can give rise to problems. Often issues are resolved
between a party seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality and the state,
which either agrees or concedes, but other interested parties are not
heard. This has given rise to difficult ancillary litigation." 6 The courts
should require notice to all interested adverse parties before allowing such
a result.
C. Affirmative Litigation
As the state's chief lawyer, the attorney general has long been
permitted to challenge the actions of administrative agencies" 7 and the
constitutionality of the legislation of another jurisdiction." 8 His standing,
however, to test the constitutional validity of an act of his own legislature
has been criticized by at least one commentator.
The acts of an elected body of legislators should generally be
treated as co-extensive with the best interests of the govern-
ment, and even if an attorney general has personal doubts as to
the validity of a statute, his duties seem to require that he
enforce the statute until it is repealed or successfully challenged
by those who are personally injured by it." 9
112. State Dental Council & Examining Bd. v. Pollock, 457 Pa. 264, 318 A.2d 910
(1974).
113. This is not reflected in the opinion because the commonwealth court upheld the
suspension by a 3-3 per curiam vote. The author, however, as the advocate for the
Commonwealth, endured the "slings and arrows" of the court.
114. Commonwealth ex rel. Kane v. McKechnie, 467 Pa. 430, 358 A.2d 419 (1976).
115. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Shapp, C 74-2959 (Pa. E.D. 1978).
116. See, e.g., Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 371 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
modified 73 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Pa.
1973), appeal dismissed, 495 F.2d 1095 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
117. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sorensen v. State Bd. of Equilization & Assessment, 123
Neb. 259, 242 N.W. 609 (1932).
118. See, e.g., Hopkins Savings Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935); Ohio v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
119. Comment, An Attorney General's Standing Before the Supreme Court to Attack
It is unclear, however, what "duties" require an attorney general to
enforce a statute that he sincerely believes is unconstitutional. Certainly
the attorney general's duty to uphold the state and federal constitutions do
not impose this burden, but dictate the opposite.
The most reasonable view is that the attorney general must have
standing as a defender of the public interest to attack unconstitutional
legislation.120 Otherwise, many individual citizens who lack the expertise
or finances to challenge legislation will suffer needlessly.
121
VI. Conclusion
Putting the discussed powers into practical effect is not an easy task,
and no general guidelines are here attempted. Some considerations,
however, are worthy of mention. First, when a statute encroaches the
power of the executive branch, the attorney general's role as counsel to
that branch imposes upon him a greater duty to test the constitutional
issues than in other cases, especially since it is unlikely that a private
party will do so. Second, when a statute affects the personal or property
rights of individuals inter se the proper forum to adjudicate constitution-
ality is through a private law suit, in which the attorney general may or
may not wish to intervene, depending on the importance of the policy to
his office and to the administration. Third, on a close question, he must
consider the likelihood of the issue being tested if he does not act. Only
by issuing an opinion or instituting a law suit will unconstitutional action
be forestalled. But, when the statutory duty falls upon a state agency, the
attorney general does not have the liberty of bringing suit to challenge the
constitutionality of the action taken, because he cannot very well sue his
the Constitutionality of Legislation, 26 U. CHi. L. REv. 624, 627 (1959).
120. Numerous state courts have confirmed that the attorney general's authority to
challenge the constitutional validity of a state statute is in accordance with his broad
common-law powers. See State ex rel. Watson v. Kirkman, 158 Fla. 11, 27 So. 2d 610 (1946);
State ex rel. Landes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 115 Fla. 189, 155 So. 823 (1934); State v.
Washburn, 177 La. 27, 147 So. 489 (1933); Greenway's Case, 319 Mass. 121, 65 N.E.2d 16
(1946); State ex rel. Olsen v. Public Service Comm'n, 129 Mont. 106, 283 P.2d 594 (1958);
State ex rel. Evans v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wash. 2d 133, 247 P.2d 787 (1952). See
generally NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATrORNEY
GENERAL 32-61 (1971).
121. This point is emphasized in two cases in which the attorney general sought judicial
determinations that certain state actions were unconstitutional. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of
Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 564, 262 A.2d 21 (Ch. Div. 1970); Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47,
456 P.2d 177 (1969). In State Board, the court remarked,
In equity, as in the law court, the Attorney-General has the right, in cases
where the property of the sovereign or the interests of the public are directly
concerned, to institute suit, by what may be called civil information, for their
protection. The state is not left without redress in its own courts because no private
citizen chooses to encounter the difficulty of defending it, but has appointed this
high public officer on whom it has cast the responsibility and to whom, therefore, it
has given the right of appearing in its behalf and invoking the judgment of the courts
on such questions of public moment.
108 N.J. Super at 572, 262 A.2d at 25 (Ch. Div. 1970), (quoting from Wilentz v. Hendrick-
son, 133 N.J. Eq. 447, 445, 33 A.2d 366, 374-75 (Ch. 1943), aff'd, 135 N.J. Eq. 244, 38 A.2d
199 (1944)) (emphasis in State Board opinion). See also Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38
(E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974) (attorney general may
intervene on behalf of Commonwealth's citizens under doctrine of parens patriae to advo-
cate unconstitutionality of state statute).
own client. In such a case he must either issue an opinion or bring an
action to uphold the powers of the state official. Fourth, when the issue is
close but the matter is certain to be tested in court, the attorney general
may rely on the presumption of constitutionality. Fifth, in complicated
fact situations involving detailed analyses of the due process and equal
protection clauses, the attorney general should recognize his limitations
and defer to the courts. Last, because of the danger of upsetting the
delicate balance of powers in each branch of government, the attorney
general should tread lightly on statutes dealing with the legislature and its
powers.
